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Abstract Most competitive social health insurance mar-
kets include risk equalization to compensate insurers for
predictable variation in healthcare expenses. Empirical
literature shows that even the most sophisticated risk
equalization models—with advanced morbidity adjusters—
substantially undercompensate insurers for selected groups
of high-risk individuals. In the presence of premium reg-
ulation, these undercompensations confront consumers and
insurers with incentives for risk selection. An important
reason for the undercompensations is that not all infor-
mation with predictive value regarding healthcare expenses
is appropriate for use as a morbidity adjuster. To reduce
incentives for selection regarding specific groups we pro-
pose overpaying morbidity adjusters that are already
included in the risk equalization model. This paper illus-
trates the idea of overpaying by merging data on morbidity
adjusters and healthcare expenses with health survey
information, and derives three preconditions for meaning-
ful application. Given these preconditions, we think over-
paying may be particularly useful for pharmacy-based cost
groups.
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Introduction
Most competitive social health insurance markets include
risk equalization (RE) to compensate insurers for pre-
dictable variation in medical spending. In the past decades
RE models have evolved from simple demographic mod-
els—using risk adjusters based on age and gender—to more
sophisticated models using risk adjusters based on (prior)
healthcare utilization and expenses (henceforth called
morbidity adjusters). For example, the RE model used in the
health insurance exchanges in the United States and the one
used in the German sickness fund market include morbidity
adjusters based on diagnoses obtained from healthcare uti-
lization [1, 2]. The RE model used in the Dutch basic health
insurance includes morbidity adjusters based on diagnoses,
drug prescriptions, durable medical equipment and prior
expenses. Even these sophisticated RE models substantially
undercompensate insurers for selected groups of high-risk
individuals [3, 4]. With undercompensation we mean that
the predicted expenses (according to the relevant RE model)
systematically fall below the actual expenses. The opposite
is referred to as overcompensation. Under premium regu-
lation, as applied in all aforementioned countries, under-
and overcompensations confront consumers and insurers
with incentives for risk selection [5]. Risk selection is
undesirable since it may reduce (1) the quality of healthcare
(since insurers have a disincentive to meet the preferences
of the chronically ill), (2) the efficiency of healthcare (since
risk selection may be a more cost-effective strategy for
insurers to make profits than improving the efficiency of
care), (3) the efficient sorting of consumers among health
plans (when market segmentation distorts the premium
levels of health plans), and (4) solidarity (when the same
market segmentation causes the chronically ill to face
higher premiums than the healthy).
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An important reason for the remaining undercompen-
sations is that morbidity adjusters in RE models are—to
some extent—incomplete since not all information with
predictive value regarding healthcare expenses is consid-
ered appropriate for use as a morbidity adjuster. For
example, Dutch enrollees are classified in a pharmacy-
based cost group (PCG) for Parkinson’s disease only if they
used at least 181 of the DDD (defined daily dose) of the
relevant drugs in the previous year. The rationale for this
181-DDD threshold is to mitigate perverse incentives for
insurers to provide enrollees with additional drugs with the
goal of receiving higher RE payments in later years. With a
threshold of 1 DDD, for instance, it would be relatively
easy and profitable for insurers to provide additional drugs
to some enrollees in order to have them classified in a PCG
for next year. Although the 181-DDD threshold mitigates
perverse incentives it also results in undercompensation of
enrollees with Parkinson’s disease who did not exceed this
threshold. As a result the entire group of enrollees who
have used the relevant drugs (i.e. those who used C181
DDD plus those who used\181 DDD in the previous year)
will on average be undercompensated, leaving insurers
with incentives for risk selection against the entire group.
To reduce incentives for risk selection regarding specific
groups we propose ‘overpaying’ morbidity adjusters that
are already in the RE model. With overpaying we mean
that the group of individuals scoring on a particular mor-
bidity adjuster is provided with an explicit extra compen-
sation on top of their average expenses. In other words, this
group is ‘overcompensated’ on purpose. This explicit extra
compensation is referred to as ‘overpayment’. In the
example of the PCG for Parkinson’s disease, overpaying
could mean that individuals in this PCG are overpaid to
such an extent that the entire group of people who used the
relevant drugs in the previous year (i.e. including those
who did not reach the 181-DDD threshold) is sufficiently
compensated. The goal of this paper is to illustrate and
discuss the effects of overpaying and to derive precondi-
tions for meaningful real-world application of this concept.
The paper is structured as follows. ‘‘Criteria for mor-
bidity adjusters in risk equalization models’’ provides some
examples of restrictions applied to morbidity adjusters used
in practice over the past two decades. ‘‘The essence of
overpaying morbidity adjusters’’ describes the essence of
overpaying morbidity adjusters and ‘‘Empirical illustra-
tion’’ provides a simplified empirical illustration. To indi-
cate the potential for real-world application,
‘‘Preconditions for overpaying morbidity adjusters’’ for-
mulates three preconditions and ‘‘Possible applications’’
applies these to some morbidity adjusters used in practice.
‘‘Overpaying versus optimal risk adjustment’’ discusses the
similarities and differences between the ideas presented
here and the concept of optimal risk adjustment proposed
by Glazer and McGuire [6, 7]. ‘‘Conclusion’’ summarizes
the main conclusions and ‘‘Discussion’’ provides issues for
discussion and further research.
Criteria for morbidity adjusters in risk
equalization models
For meaningful use in RE models, risk factors should at least
have some predictive value regarding future healthcare
expenses. Predictive value is not the only criterion, however.
Other relevant criteria are validity, appropriateness of
incentives and feasibility [8]. Validity implies that a mor-
bidity adjuster should strongly relate to a chronic condition.
If this is not the case, inclusion of the morbidity adjuster in
the RE model may lead to overcompensation of people
without chronic conditions. Appropriateness of incentives
implies that inclusion of a morbidity adjuster in the RE
model should not reduce health insurers’ incentives for
efficiency. Morbidity adjusters directly based on prior
expenses, for instance, may be considered inappropriate
since these would punish efficient insurers with lower RE
payments. Moreover, morbidity adjusters should not create
incentives for insurers to provide additional—but therapeu-
tically unnecessary—healthcare. For example, if use of only
one DDD of a certain drug is needed for classification in a
PCG, insurers may be confronted with incentives to provide
enrollees with some additional drugs in order to receive
higher RE payments in later years. Feasibility implies that
the information must be obtainable for all (potential) enrol-
lees without undue expenditures of time or money. Table 1
provides six examples of how these criteria led to restrictions
of morbidity adjusters developed and applied in the United
States and/or Europe over the past decades. While these
restrictions are justified by the aforementioned criteria, they
may result in selection incentives regarding specific groups.
Hence we show how overpaying can mitigate this problem.
The essence of overpaying morbidity adjusters
Let us illustrate our framework for a pharmacy-based cost
group, which we refer to as ‘PCG-P’, that is included in the
RE model in the form of a dummy variable. Under the
conventional RE estimation procedure of ordinary least-
squares regression (OLS), the group of enrollees classified
in PCG-P (group X) is sufficiently compensated. This will
probably not be the case for another group that also used
the relevant drugs for PCG-P but stayed below the
181-DDD threshold (group Y). Though this group did not
reach the threshold, it is likely to be overrepresented with
high-risk individuals. Exclusion of group Y from PCG-P
probably leads to undercompensation of this group. As a
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result, the entire group that used the relevant drugs (i.e.
XY) will also be undercompensated. Given that the model
is estimated with OLS and based on a zero-sum principle,
as is common in practice, the complementary group of
people who did not use any DDD of the drugs relevant for
PCG-P (group Z) will be overcompensated. The essence of
our proposal is that undercompensation of XY and over-
compensation of Z can be removed by overpaying X. For a
single set of X, Y and Z, the height of overpayment can be
calculated easily.
In case of zero-sum RE, an increase of the RE payment
for group X implies a decrease of the RE payment for the
complementary group YZ. If C denotes the change in av-
erage RE payment for X, and D denotes the average pay-
ment change for YZ, the association between C and D
reads:
D ¼ C nx
ny þ nz ; ð1Þ
where nx, ny and nz represent the number of individuals in
groups X, Y and Z. If the regulator wants to reduce
undercompensation for XY to zero, C should be such that:
nxHCEx þ nyHCEy
nx þ ny ¼
nxð dHCEx þ CÞ þ nyð dHCEx  DÞ
nx þ ny ;
ð2Þ
where the left-hand side represents the average per person
actual expenses in group XY and the right-hand side rep-
resents the average per person predicted expenses for group
XY plus the net effect of overpayment C and underpay-
ment D. In case of the zero-sum RE, Eq. (2) implies that
the overcompensation on the complementary Z is reduced
to zero as well, i.e.:
HCEz ¼ ðdHCEz  DÞ; ð3Þ
where the left-hand side represents the average per person
actual expenses in group Z and the right-hand side repre-
sents the average per person predicted expenses for group
Z minus D. Integration of Eqs. (1, 3) reveals the over-
payment C that is necessary for reducing the undercom-
pensation for XY (and the overcompensation for Z) to zero:
C ¼ ðdHCEz  HCEzÞ ny þ nz
nx
ð4Þ
Table 1 Examples of explicit restrictions applied to morbidity classifications based on (prior) healthcare utilization or expenses
Case Examples of applied restrictions Morbidity classifications (Selected) references
1 Exclusion of diagnostic information not related to a specific chronic
condition and/or not well-defined
DCGs Pope et al. [12]a
Van Kleef et al. [13]b
HCCs Pope et al. [14]c
Buchner et al. [3]d
CRG Hughes et al. [15]
CDPS Kronick et al. [16]e
2 Exclusion of outpatient diagnoses DCGs Pope et al. [12]a
Prinsze and Van Vliet [17]
3 Exclusion of drug information not related to a specific chronic condition RxGroups Zhao et al. [18]
PCGs Lamers and Van Vliet [19]
RxRisk Fishman et al. [20]f
4 Exclusion of enrollees using less than 181 DDD of the relevant drugg PCGs Lamers and Van Vliet [21]
5 Exclusion of DME not related to a specific chronic condition DMEG Van Kleef and Van Vliet [22]
6 Exclusion of people with moderately high (instead of really high)
expenses in previous years
MHCG Van Kleef and Van Vliet [23]
DCG Diagnostic Cost Groups, HCC Hierarchical Condition Categories, CRG Clinical Risk Groups, CDPS Chronic Disability Payment System,
PCG Pharmacy Cost Groups, DMEG Durable Medical Equipment Groups, MHCG Multiple-year High Cost Groups
a The PIP-DCG model developed by Pope et al. is a follow-up of the DCGs developed by Ash et al. [24], Ellis and Ash [25], Ellis et al. [26]
b The Dutch DCG model developed by Van Kleef and Van Vliet is a follow-up of the Dutch DCGs developed by Lamers [27] and Prinsze and
Van Vliet [17]. The DCGs developed by Lamers [27] are based on the DCGs developed by Ash et al. [24]
c The CMS-HCC model developed by Pope et al. [14] is a follow-up of the DCGs developed by Pope et al. [12]
d The German HCC model is based on the principles of the CMS-HCC model developed by Pope et al. [14]
e CDPS is a follow-up of the Disability Payment System (DPS) developed by Kronick et al. [28]
f RxRisk is a follow-up of the Chronic Disease Score (CDS) developed by Clark et al. [29]
g Also, Fishman et al. [20] considered requiring multiple dispenses before establishing a link between an individual and a condition or group.
They rejected this requirement ‘‘because one cannot be certain—when using only automated data—that the number of dispenses observed for an
individual reflects a clinical choice or is the consequence of an insurance arrangement’’
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Equation (4) implies a first precondition for overpaying:
availability of information on population frequency, aver-
age expenses and predicted expenses (according to the
relevant RE model) for the relevant X, Y and Z groups. The
next section provides an empirical illustration in which this
information is obtained from administrative data and health
survey information.
Empirical illustration
For an empirical illustration of our framework we merge
administrative data with health survey information. The
administrative data include individual-level information on
annual healthcare expenses and risk characteristics for
almost the entire Dutch population in 2011 (N = 16.4
million) and have been used in practice for estimating the
Dutch RE model of 2014. The information comes from
various administrative sources, including insurers, the tax
collector and the registration service for social benefits.
The health survey information comes from a representative
sample of the Dutch population in 2010 (N = 16,061). This
survey is held on an annual basis by Statistics Netherlands
and includes questions on general health status, physical
and mental impairments, particular diseases and prior uti-
lization of healthcare. The combination of this adminis-
trative and survey information allows (1) estimating the RE
model of 2014 on data from year t, (2) predicting indi-
vidual expenses for year t, (3) calculating individual
residual expenses for year t, (4) defining selective groups of
high-risk individuals using the survey information from
year t-1, and (5) calculating the average under/overcom-
pensation for these groups. Table 2 shows the average
undercompensation for six groups of relatively high-risk
individuals. Although the Dutch RE model succeeds in
compensating for a major share of the above-average
expenses for these risk groups, substantial undercompen-
sations remain.
The Dutch RE model of 2014 is the product of more
than 20 years of research and experience and includes the
following risk classes: 40 classes based on interactions
between age and gender; 24 risk classes based on the use of
specific prescription drugs in the previous year, referred to
as pharmacy-based cost groups or PCGs; 16 risk classes
based on diagnostic information from hospital treatment in
the previous year, referred to as diagnoses-based cost
groups or DCGs; 7 risk classes for people with high
healthcare expenses in multiple prior years, referred to as
multiple-year high cost groups or MHCGs; 5 risk classes
based on the use of durable medical equipment in the
previous year, referred to as durable medical equipment
cost groups or DMEGs; 12 risk classes based on
interactions between socioeconomic status and age; 10 risk
classes based on regional characteristics; and 19 risk
classes based on interactions between source of income and
age. All risk adjusters have been carefully developed in
research programs initiated by the Dutch Ministry of
Health. In this empirical illustration we will not question
the appropriateness of these risk adjusters in terms of the
criteria described in ‘‘Criteria for morbidity adjusters in
risk equalization models’’.
Of all risk adjusters in the Dutch RE model, PCGs,
DCGs, DMEGs and MHCGs are the most direct indicators
of health status and are denoted as ‘morbidity’ adjusters. A
reason for the undercompensations in Table 2 is that these
morbidity adjusters do not identify all high-risk individu-
als. This can be illustrated by a simple crossing of two
classifications: (1) yes/no classified in a PCG, DCG,
DMEG and/or MHCG (i.e. information obtained from the
administrative data) and (2) yes/no self-reported chronic
condition (i.e. information obtained from the survey data).
Table 3 shows the population frequency, average actual
expenses, average predicted expenses by the Dutch RE
model of 2014 and the average under- or overcompensation
per group, conditional on the survey sample (because the
information on self-reported chronic condition is only
available for survey respondents). As was already shown in
Table 2, the group with a self-reported chronic condition
(31.5 % of the population) is undercompensated by 331
euros per person per year. The complementary group with
no chronic condition (68.5 %) is overcompensated by 153
per person per year. More remarkable is the undercom-
pensation of 112 euros for the group with a ‘PCG, DCG,
DMEG and/or MHCG’ (22 %) and the overcompensation
of 32 euros for the complementary group (78 %), though
these over- and undercompensations are not statistically
significant from zero. Looking at crossings of ‘PCG, DCG,
DMEG and/or MHCG’ and ‘self-reported chronic condi-
tion’, it is not surprising that the average expenses are
highest (5337 euros) for the group scoring on both items
(16.2 %) and lowest (785 euros) for the group scoring on
none of these items (62.6 %). The groups scoring on only
one of the two items (5.8 and 15.4 %) have average
expenses somewhere in between, i.e. 2990 and 1524 euros,
respectively. Table 3 clearly shows that not all individuals
with a self-reported chronic condition are identified by
PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG. As a result, the entire
group of relatively high-risk individuals, i.e. those with a
PCG, DCG, DMEG, MHCG and/or a self-reported chronic
condition (5.8 ? 15.4 ? 16.2 = 37.4 %), is undercom-
pensated (by 215 euros per person per year). The com-
plementary group, i.e. those without a PCG, DCG, DMEG,
MHCG and without a self-reported chronic condition
(62.6 %) is overcompensated (by 129 euros per person per
year).
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Table 2 Population frequency, average actual expenses, average predicted expenses and average undercompensation (-) in euros per person per
year, given the Dutch RE model of 2014
Subgroup based on health survey information
from the prior year
Population
frequency (%)
Average actual
expensesa
Average predicted
expenses
Average
undercompensation (-)b
Self-reported chronic condition 31.5 3480 3149 -331*
Worst score physical health (SF-12)c 18.9 4474 3803 -671*
Contact with specialist in last 12 months 37.8 3107 2786 -321*
Hospitalization in last 12 months 6.5 5775 5201 -574*
Use of physiotherapy in last 12 months 21.8 2925 2605 -320*
Use of prescribed drugs in last 14 days 35.7 3126 2946 -180*
a Average expenses in the population (relevant for risk equalization) equal 1785 euros per person per year. Expenses include general practitioner,
pharmacy, ambulatory care and hospital care, but exclude mental care and long-term care (including hospitalization longer than 1 year)
b Since the survey groups are based on a relatively small sample of the Dutch population (N = 16,061), the undercompensations presented here
are subject to random variation in actual expenses. An asterisk indicates that the undercompensation for a group is statistically significantly
different from zero (p\ 0.05). The undercompensations presented here slightly differ from those presented by Van Kleef et al. [30] because
survey respondents with missing scores on ‘self-reported chronic condition’ are excluded here (N = 6)
c For composition (and underlying questions) of this score see Ware et al. [31]
Table 3 Population frequency,
average actual expenses,
average predicted expenses and
average over (?) or
undercompensation (-) in euros
per person per year, given the
Dutch RE model of 2014
PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG Total
No Yes
Self-reported chronic condition
No
Population frequency (%) 62.6 5.8 68.5
Average actual expensesa 785 2990 972
Average predicted expenses 913 3404 1125
Average under/overcompensationb 129* 415* 153*
Yes
Population frequency (%) 15.4 16.2 31.5
Average actual expensesa 1524 5337 3480
Average predicted expenses 1163 5035 3149
Average under/overcompensationb -361* -302* -331*
Total
Population frequency (%) 78.0 22.0 100
Average actual expensesa 930 4716 1763
Average predicted expenses 963 4604 1763
Average under/overcompensationb 32 -112 0
PCG Pharmacy Cost Groups, DCG Diagnostic Cost Groups, DMEG Durable Medical Equipment Groups,
MHCG Multiple-year High Cost Groups
a Average expenses in the population (relevant for risk equalization) equal 1785 euros per person per year.
Expenses include general practitioner, pharmacy, ambulatory care and hospital care, but exclude mental
care and long-term care (including hospitalization longer than 1 year). Average expenses in the survey
sample equal 1763 per person per year, indicating that the survey respondents are on average a little
healthier than the entire population, though the difference between the sample and population averages is
not statistically significant (p\ 0.05)
b Since the survey groups are based on a relatively small sample of the Dutch population (N = 16,061), the
under/overcompensations presented here are subject to random variation in actual expenses. An asterisk
indicates that the undercompensation for a group is statistically significantly different from zero (p\ 0.05).
The under/overcompensations presented here slightly differ from those presented by Van Kleef et al. [30]
because survey respondents with missing scores on ‘self-reported chronic condition’ are excluded here
(N = 6)
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Though we are aware that a sample with ‘just’ 16,061
records is probably not appropriate for real-world appli-
cations of overpaying (see next section), it provides a good
basis for illustrating the effects of overpaying. Let us
assume the regulator wants to remove the undercompen-
sation on the total group with a PCG, DCG, DMEG,
MHCG and/or a self-reported chronic condition (37.4 % of
the population). In the terminology of the previous section
this would be the XY group. The complementary group of
people without a PCG, DCG, DMEG, MHCG and without
a self-reported chronic condition (62.6 %) would be the Z
group. Table 4 presents the results for both the XY and the
Z group, which are no more than weighted averages
derived from Table 3. The Dutch RE model undercom-
pensates the XY group by 215 euros and overcompensates
the Z group by 129 euros per person per year. When we
enter the information from Table 3 into Eq. (4), the nec-
essary overpayment for X (those with a PCG, DCG,
DMEG and/or MHCG) appears to be 454.5 euros, on
average, per person per year. This implies an underpay-
ment of 128.2 euros for the complementary group (those
without a PCG, DCG, DMEG and MHCG).
As expected, the overpayment for X (and underpay-
ment for the complementary group) reduces the under-
compensation for XY to zero (see also bottom row of
Table 4). The same holds for the overcompensation of Z.
As shown in Table 5, however, this is not true for the X
and Y groups separately. For X, the initial undercom-
pensation of 112 euros changes into an overcompensation
of 342 euros, while for Y the initial undercompensation of
361 euros increases to an undercompensation of 490
euros. As a result, incentives for selection against Y and
in favor of X increase. This implies a second pre-condi-
tion for overpaying morbidity adjuster X: risk selection
against XY (and in favor of Z) must be considered more
likely/problematical than risk selection against Y (and in
favor of X). The next section elaborates on this and other
preconditions.
Table 4 Population frequency, average actual expenses, average predicted expenses and average over (?) undercompensation (-) in euros per
person per year, given the Dutch RE model of 2014
PCG, DCG, DMEG, MHCG and/or self-reported chronic condition
Yes (XY) No (Z)
Population frequency (%) 37.4 62.6
Average actual expenses 3404 785
Average predicted expenses 3189 913
Average under/overcompensationa by Dutch RE model -215* 129*
Average under/overcompensationa by Dutch RE model ? overpaymentb 0 0
PCG Pharmacy Cost Groups, DCG Diagnostic Cost Groups, DMEG Durable Medical Equipment Groups, MHCG Multiple-year High Cost
Groups
a Since the survey groups are based on a relatively small sample of the Dutch population (N = 16,061), the under/overcompensations presented
here are subject to random variation in actual expenses. An asterisk indicates that the under/overcompensation for a group is statistically
significantly different from zero (p\ 0.05)
b A 454.5-euro-per-person overpayment of individuals in a PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG (22 % of the population) and a 128.2-euro-per-
person underpayment of individuals in the complementary group (78 %)
Table 5 Population frequency and over (?) undercompensation (-) in euros per person per year, given the Dutch RE model of 2014 with and
without overpayment
X Y Z
Population frequency (%) 22.0 15.4 62.6
Average under/overcompensationa by Dutch RE model -112 -361* 129*
Average under/overcompensationa by Dutch RE model ? overpaymentb 342* -490* 0
a Since the survey groups are based on a relatively small sample of the Dutch population (N = 16,061), the under/overcompensations presented
here are subject to random variation in actual expenses. An asterisk indicates that the under/overcompensation for a group is statistically
significantly different from zero (p\ 0.05)
b A 454.5-euro-per-person overpayment of individuals in a PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG (22 % of the population) and a 128.2-euro-per-
person underpayment of individuals in the complementary group (78 %)
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Preconditions for overpaying morbidity adjusters
As concluded in ‘‘The essence of overpaying morbidity
adjusters’’, a first precondition for meaningful application
of overpaying is availability of information on average
expenses, predicted expenses and population frequency of
the relevant X, Y and Z groups. For X this information is
probably inherently available in the datasets used for RE,
since X is included as a morbidity adjuster in the RE
model. In case of explicit restrictions applied to morbidity
adjusters (like the examples in Table 1) this may also be
true for Y and Z, since these restrictions require availability
of information to distinguish between X and Y. If infor-
mation on Y and Z is not available for the entire popula-
tion, it could be sufficient to subtract population frequency
and average actual and predicted expenses from a sample.
It should be said, however, that in the case of relatively
small samples, such as the survey used in this paper
(N = 16,061), these parameters may be influenced by
random variation. Our empirical application may therefore
not be feasible for real-world implementation.
As concluded in ‘‘Empirical illustration’’, a second
precondition is that risk selection against XY (and in favor
of Z) must be considered more likely/problematical than
risk selection against Y (and in favor of X). The reason is
that overpaying improves compensations at the level of XY
and Z, but worsens them at the level of X and Y. As a
result, incentives for selection against Y and in favor of X
increase. The likelihood of risk selection regarding a
specific group does not only depend on the level of under-
or overcompensation and the size of the group, but also on
the possibilities for risk selection against or in favor of that
group. Social health insurance markets often include open
enrollment requirements, implying that insurers are not
allowed to explicitly deter individuals. Nevertheless,
insurers often have possibilities of exploiting subtle forms
of risk selection via coverage, quality and service levels.
For example, if patients with a certain disease are under-
compensated by the RE model, and these patients have a
preference for a specialist with the best reputation in
treating this disease, insurers can discourage these patients
from enrolling by not contracting this specialist. Such
subtle forms of risk selection, however, are only possible if
the preferences (in terms of coverage, quality and service
levels) of overcompensated risk groups differ from those of
the undercompensated risk groups. In the case of groups X
and Y, this implies that risk selection may only occur if
these groups are heterogeneous in their preferences.
The extent to which risk selection regarding a group is
considered problematical depends on the potential selec-
tion actions and their effects. Some selection actions may
be considered more problematical than others. For
example, ‘quality skimping’ may be considered worse than
‘selective advertising’. The reason is that quality skimping
may not only reduce solidarity but also the efficiency and
quality of healthcare, contrary to selective advertising
which will not directly affect efficiency and quality of care.
Judging whether risk selection regarding X and Y is more
problematical than risk selection regarding XY requires an
evaluation of the potential selection actions regarding these
groups and the consequences of these actions.
A third precondition is that X itself sufficiently fulfills
the criteria for morbidity adjusters as listed in ‘‘Criteria for
morbidity adjusters in risk equalization models’’. Though
all morbidity adjusters used in RE models have been (im-
plicitly) approved by the regulator, a new round of evalu-
ation may be necessary when considering overpaying. The
reason is that overpayment of X intensifies incentives for
insurers to have enrollees classified in group X. More
specifically, incentives for insurers to avoid healthcare
utilization that leads to classification in group X decrease
(i.e. a loss of efficiency incentives) while incentives to
provide additional—but therapeutically unnecessary—
healthcare increase (i.e. an increase in perverse incentives).
These intensified perverse incentives require reconsidering
the likelihood that insurers will influence healthcare pro-
vision this way.
Possible applications
In theory overpaying can be applied to any type of mor-
bidity adjuster. Let us define some possible modalities for
the six cases in Table 1. For all these cases, group X could
include the individuals classified under a morbidity adjus-
ter. In case 1, group Y could include individuals with a
diagnosis explicitly excluded from the relevant classifica-
tion (but with predictive value for future healthcare
expenses). In case 2, group Y could include individuals
with an outpatient diagnosis of which the ‘inpatient coun-
terpart’ (i.e. the same diagnosis for inpatient care) is
included in the relevant classification. In case 3, group Y
could include individuals with utilization of drugs explic-
itly excluded from the PCGs. In case 4, group Y could
include users of the relevant drugs who did not reach the
181-DDD threshold. In case 5, group Y could include
individuals with utilization of durable medical equipment
(DME) explicitly excluded from the DMEGs. In case 6,
group Y would include individuals with moderately high
healthcare expenses in previous years. In all cases Z would
be the complementary group of XY.
Real-world application of overpaying is only meaning-
ful if the three preconditions mentioned in the previous
section are sufficiently fulfilled. Availability of information
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is a ‘conditio sine qua non’. The other two preconditions
may involve trade-offs, e.g. between the positive effects of
avoiding risk selection and the negative effect of intensi-
fying perverse incentives. The net benefit from overpaying
morbidity adjusters is the balance of these positive and
negative effects and may differ across types of morbidity
adjusters and characteristics of healthcare schemes. With
respect to the morbidity adjusters presented in Table 1, the
net benefit of overpaying may be largest for the Dutch
PCGs (case 4). In this case, group X includes individuals
with 181 DDD or more of the relevant drug and group Y
includes those with ‘just’ 1-180 DDD. In this particular
case, risk selection against XY (and in favor of Z) may be
more likely than risk selection against Y (and in favor of
X). Moreover, the possibilities for providing additional
drugs in order to have more enrollees classified in a PCG
are minor (given the 181-DDD threshold). For the other
cases the benefit may be smaller (but not necessarily neg-
ative). In case 2 it may be possible for insurers to substitute
outpatient treatments with inpatient treatments. In the other
cases, preferences of X and Y are likely to be heteroge-
neous to some extent, implying possibilities for risk
selection against Y (and in favor of X). The latter also
holds for the groups in our empirical illustration.
Overpaying versus optimal risk adjustment
The ideas presented in this paper relate to the concept of
optimal risk adjustment proposed by Glazer and McGuire
[6, 7]. Glazer and McGuire have advocated optimal risk
adjustment as a remedy for the problem that risk adjusters
used in RE models are often imperfect signals of individ-
uals’ true risk. This remedy can be illustrated with the
following example. Let us assume that ‘age’ is included as
a risk adjuster in the RE model, but true type ‘yes/no
suffering from Parkinson’s disease’ is not. Although the
two variables are correlated, age is an imperfect signal of
‘yes/no suffering from Parkinson’s disease’ since the cor-
relation is not perfect. Consequently, conventional RE (in
which RE payments are based on the expected expenses for
risk adjusters included in the model) will undercompensate
for Parkinson’s disease. This undercompensation provides
insurers with incentives for risk selection, for instance by
skimping on (quality of) services that are specifically used
by people suffering from Parkinson’s disease. In order to
reduce such incentives, Glazer and McGuire propose to
overpay the high age groups. Thus, the concept of optimal
risk adjustment is based on the correlation between risk
adjusters included in the RE model and true risk (for which
the model does not compensate explicitly).
A similarity between the idea of overpaying (this paper)
and the concept of optimal risk adjustment is the principle
that the RE payment for a morbidity group included in the
RE model does not necessarily equal the mean actual
expenses of that group (i.e. conventional risk adjustment).
An important difference, however, is that the concept of
overpaying is not based on the idea that risk adjusters (e.g.
age) in the RE model are imperfect signals of true risk (e.g.
Parkinson’s disease), but on the observation that risk
adjusters in the RE model (e.g. PCG for Parkinson’s dis-
ease) are incomplete due to explicit restrictions (e.g. clas-
sification in PCG for Parkinson’s disease only if an
individual has used C181 DDD of the relevant drugs).
Another difference concerns the criterion and informa-
tion needed for determining the overpayment. Glazer and
McGuire [7] propose to overpay risk adjusters in the RE
model such that insurers are sufficiently compensated at the
level of healthcare services at which insurers make deci-
sions about resource allocation. For each healthcare service
insurers should be compensated sufficiently for the total
healthcare expenses of the group using that service, thereby
avoiding incentives to skimp on (quality of) services
specifically used by high-risk consumers. A difficulty for
implementation of this approach may be that the level of
healthcare services at which insurers make decisions about
resource allocation is unknown to the regulator. In the
concept of overpaying (this paper), the overpayment for a
risk adjuster should be such that on average the entire
group of individuals identified by the information under-
lying this risk adjuster (i.e. those classified by this risk
adjuster—group X—plus those not classified due to
explicit restrictions—group Y) is sufficiently compensated.
Since explicit restrictions require availability of informa-
tion for making a distinction between groups X and Y, we
expect the data needed for applying the concept of over-
paying is probably inherently available in existing
databases.
Despite the differences between the concept of over-
paying proposed in this paper and the concept of optimal
risk adjustment proposed by Glazer and McGuire, they
probably work in the same direction. The reason is that
both measures generally increase RE payments for indi-
viduals classified as high risk in terms of the risk adjusters
included in the RE model and decrease them for those
classified as low risks in terms of these risk adjusters. More
specifically, this means that RE payments will increase for
the elderly and individuals scoring on morbidity indicators
and decrease for the complementary groups. Given this
pattern, it is interesting to mention that overpaying and
optimal risk adjustment will probably improve compensa-
tion for many high-risk groups that are not explicitly
included as risk adjusters in the RE model. This is illus-
trated by Table 6, which shows the effect of the overpay-
ment (and underpayment) derived in our empirical
illustration on the six groups from Table 2. The direction of
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the effects is clear: the increase in RE payment for mor-
bidity adjusters does not only improve compensation for
those with a self-reported chronic condition, but also for
the other five groups. The simple explanation is that indi-
viduals classified in (one or more) morbidity classes of the
RE model are likely to be overrepresented in (almost) any
identifiable group of high-risk individuals that is not
explicitly included in the RE model. Consequently, groups
of high-risk individuals profit from overpaying morbidity
adjusters since for them the total compensation from the
RE model increases. The opposite holds for groups of low-
risk individuals for whom the total compensation
decreases.
Conclusion
Several morbidity adjusters used in risk equalization
models are subject to explicit restrictions, since not all
information with predictive value regarding healthcare
expenses is considered appropriate for the purpose of risk
equalization. In general, this could mean that a certain
morbidity class (e.g. PCG for Parkinson’s disease) includes
group X (individuals who used C181 DDD of the relevant
drugs) but explicitly excludes group Y (individuals who
used only 1–180 DDD of the relevant drugs). Under con-
ventional risk equalization this implies that X will be suf-
ficiently compensated, but Y will be undercompensated. As
a result, group XY (all individuals who used the relevant
drugs) will also be undercompensated. This paper proposed
to reduce incentives for risk selection against XY by
overpaying X to such an extent than the total group XY (as
well as the complementary group Z) is sufficiently com-
pensated. For meaningful real-world applications, three
preconditions should be sufficiently fulfilled: (1) for groups
X, Y and Z information must be available on population
frequency and average expenses, (2) risk selection against
XY (and in favor of Z) must be considered more likely/
problematical than risk selection against Y (in favor of X),
and (3) morbidity adjuster X should sufficiently fulfil the
common criteria for risk adjusters such as appropriateness
of incentives and feasibility. Given these preconditions,
overpaying may be particularly useful for the Dutch PCGs.
Discussion
An open question is how to calculate the overpayment for
morbidity adjusters. Eqs. (1– 4) allow calculating a ‘sec-
ond-stage’ per person overpayment for individuals with
morbidity adjuster X. With second-stage we mean that the
overpayment is calculated after a first stage in which the
risk equalization model is estimated and the predicted
expenses are calculated. This approach has an important
shortcoming: the sum of predicted healthcare expenses and
the over/underpayment probably does not comply with the
least-squares criterion on which most risk equalization
models rely in the first stage. Moreover, the equations do
not allow calculating multiple overpayments (e.g. sepa-
rately for PCG-A and PCG-B) simultaneously. A promis-
ing measure to overcome these complications is to estimate
risk equalization models by ‘constrained least-squares
regression’ instead of ‘ordinary least-squares regression’.
The former method allows constraining the estimated
Table 6 Average undercompensation (-) in euros per person per year by the Dutch RE model of 2014 supplemented with a per person
overpayment C for individuals in a PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG (and a per person underpayment for the complementary group)
Subgroup based on health survey information from the prior year C = 0a,b C = 454.5b,c
Self-reported chronic condition -331* -160
Worst score physical health (SF-12)d -671* -479*
Contact with medical specialist in last 12 months -321* -211*
Hospitalization in last 12 months -574* -338
Use of physiotherapy in last 12 months -320* -253*
Use of prescribed drugs in last 14 days -180* -17
PCG Pharmacy Cost Groups, DCG Diagnostic Cost Groups, DMEG Durable Medical Equipment Groups, MHCG Multiple-year High Cost
Groups
a C = 0 implies no overpayment. Therefore undercompensations (-) are similar to those in Table 2
b Since the survey groups are based on a relatively small sample of the Dutch population (N = 16,061), the undercompensations presented here
are subject to random variation in actual expenses. An asterisk indicates that the undercompensation for a group is statistically significantly
different from zero (p\ 0.05)
c A 454.5-euro-per-person overpayment of individuals in a PCG, DCG, DMEG and/or MHCG (22 % of the population) implies a 128.2-euro-
per-person underpayment of individuals in the complementary group (78 %)
d For composition (and underlying questions) of this score see Ware et al. [30]
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coefficients such that the over- or undercompensation of
certain risk groups (e.g. XY) equals zero. Under this pro-
cedure the estimation of predicted costs and the calculation
of the overpayment are integrated in a single-stage proce-
dure. This results in a risk equalization model that hits the
desired payment target (e.g. no under/overcompensation
for XY) and complies with the least-squares criterion. This
innovative method has been proposed and illustrated by
McGuire et al. [9], though for other purposes than
overpaying.
This paper has focused on the effects of overpaying on
incentives for risk selection. From this perspective, over-
paying a morbidity group (e.g. PCG for Parkinson’s dis-
ease) is interesting when risk selection against XY (all
individuals who used the relevant drugs) is considered
more likely/problematical than risk selection against Y
(individuals who used the relevant drugs but stayed below
the 181-DDD threshold) and in favor of X (individuals who
reached the 181-DDD threshold). In most countries, how-
ever, the goal of risk equalization is not only to reduce
incentives for risk selection but also to achieve a level
playing field for insurers. From the latter perspective, a
point of attention is to what extent the ratio of ‘the number
of individuals in group X’ and ‘the number of individuals
in group Y’ varies across insurers. Insurers for whom this
ratio is relatively high would benefit more from overpaying
than insurers for whom this ratio is relatively low. Ceteris
paribus, overpaying would then distort the level playing
field.
Overpaying morbidity adjusters because of explicit
restrictions applied to these risk adjusters is just one motive
for overpaying. Existing literature provides other motives.
As discussed above, Glazer and McGuire [7] have pro-
posed overpaying in order to directly mitigate incentives
for skimping on (quality of) services that are specifically
used by high-risk individuals. Jack [10] and Bijlsma et al.
[11] have proposed overpaying in order to take into
account differences in switching costs between low-risk
and high-risk individuals. Further research is necessary to
assess the compatibility of these different motives for
overpaying.
Given the ideas presented in this paper, we believe it is a
missed opportunity that in current risk equalization prac-
tices the information explicitly excluded from morbidity
classifications is considered redundant. As far as this
information contains additional predictive value regarding
healthcare expenses, it can be used for the purpose of
overpaying. In the Netherlands, for instance, prior-year
utilization of less than 181 DDD of drugs relevant for the
PCG ‘Parkinson’s disease’ does not play any role in the
calculation of risk equalization payments. This is a pity
since it contains valuable information on future healthcare
expenses of individuals suffering from Parkinson’s disease.
By using this information for overpaying the Parkinson-
PCG, incentives for selection against the entire group
suffering from Parkinson’s disease (as well as the incen-
tives for selection in favor of the group not suffering from
Parkinson’s disease) can be mitigated.
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